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Why Restate the Bundle? 
THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE RESTATEMENT OF 
PROPERTY 
Thomas W. Merrill† & Henry E. Smith†† 
INTRODUCTION 
The American Law Institute (ALI) has devoted a great 
deal of time and energy to restating the law of property. To 
date, the ALI has produced 17 volumes that bear the name 
First, Second, or Third Restatement of Property. There is 
unquestionably much that is valuable in these materials. On 
the whole, however, the effort has been a disappointment. 
Some volumes seek faithfully to restate the consensus view of 
the law; others are transparently devoted to law reform. The 
ratio of reform to restatement has increased over time, to the 
point where significant portions of the Third Restatement 
consist of repudiating what was done in the First and Second 
Restatements,1 which can hardly inspire confidence. Most 
damning of all, the effort to restate the law of property remains 
seriously incomplete. Even after 17 volumes produced over 75 
years, the Restatement of Property offers no treatment of 
adverse possession, ignores most of the law of personal 
property, says nothing about real estate transfers, recording 
acts, groundwater and mineral rights, or eminent domain, and 
does not touch intellectual property. The incompleteness 
reduces the utility of these Restatements as a research tool, 
and diminishes the incentive of lawyers to draw upon them. 
Recent data on the usage of different Restatements 
confirm the relative weakness of the Restatement of Property.2 
 
 † Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. 
 †† Fessenden Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. 
 1 The THIRD RESTATEMENT repudiates the SECOND’s version of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities, which in turn repudiated the version in the FIRST RESTATEMENT, see infra 
notes 48-66 and accompanying text; and the THIRD RESTATEMENT repudiates the FIRST 
RESTATEMENT’s version of servitudes, see infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.  
 2 We are grateful to Lance Liebman, Executive Director of the ALI, for 
providing us with this information. 
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The ALI receives royalty payments for downloads of its 
Restatements by users of Westlaw. The Restatement of Property 
generates only one-quarter the royalties generated by the 
Restatement of Contracts, and merely 15% of the royalties of 
the Restatement of Torts. Of course, it is possible that the law 
of property is contested less frequently than contracts or torts. 
But the Restatement of Property is downloaded even less than 
the Restatement of Trusts, which could be regarded as a 
subfield of property. The data on usage tend to confirm, in our 
opinion, that lawyers and scholars find the Restatement of 
Property unhelpful compared to many of the other restatement 
efforts undertaken by the ALI.3 
The failure of the Restatement of Property, at least 
relative to Contracts, Torts, Trusts, and a number of other 
subjects, raises important questions for the ALI and property 
scholars alike. In this essay we explore the possible causes of 
that failure. To a certain extent, it can be explained by 
accidents of history. As we describe in Part I, the Restatement 
of Property was conceived in extremely broad terms, so broad 
that it was probably unrealistic to expect that it could be 
completed. The property project has also been dominated by 
Reporters whose interests have been focused narrowly on 
particular subsets of the law of property, at the expense of the 
general law of property. Perhaps most critically, the Second 
and Third Restatements of Property have been given over to 
campaigns for legal reform, often entailing the repudiation of 
earlier volumes of the Restatement, which has very likely 
undermined the utility and the credibility of the ALI’s effort. 
We nevertheless argue that the roots of the failure of 
the Restatement of Property run deeper. As detailed in Part II, 
the Restatement of Property was launched as a deliberate effort 
to inject greater rigor and clarity into legal analysis by 
adopting the “scientific” terminology of Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld. Chapter 1 of the First Restatement of Property could 
be described as a Restatement of Hohfeld. This effort failed, as 
other Reporters were either hostile or indifferent to the 
program of adopting the Hohfeldian vocabulary. 
This does not mean, however, that the Hohfeldian 
legacy is irrelevant. As we argue in Part III, Hohfeld’s analysis 
 
 3 Another comparison, which we have not attempted to quantify, is to the 
relative frequency with which Restatements are referenced in leading casebooks. It is 
our impression that the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS and the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 
appear much more frequently in contracts and torts casebooks than does the 
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY in property casebooks. 
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of legal concepts was associated with a substantive theory of 
property as a formless and infinitely malleable collection of 
rules to be shaped in accordance with ad hoc perceptions of 
public policy. This substantive theory has come to be associated 
with the metaphor of the “bundle of rights” or “bundle of sticks.” 
The theory of property as a plastic concatenation of rules has 
animated the restatement project from its beginnings to the 
present day. Yet if this substantive theory is correct, it is unclear 
why it makes any sense to devote significant intellectual energy 
to trying to restate the law of property. Existing rules are likely to 
be the product of policy imperatives of the distant past, 
perpetuated by path dependency, which are largely irrelevant to 
today’s world. It would be far better to devote one’s energies to 
reforming the law, in order to make it coincide with today’s policy 
preferences. This, we think, describes the fate of the 
Restatement of Property. Its failure lies in significant part in 
the theory of property that launched it and that has been 
adhered to ever since. 
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY 
We begin with a brief review of the history of the 
Restatement of Property. That history reveals at least some of 
the sources of the relative weakness of the Restatement of 
Property. Contrary to Hegel, history is more than the unfolding 
of the implications of an Idea. Interests, personalities, and 
simple accidents also matter. 
Planning for the Restatement of Property began in 1926, 
when the ALI Executive Committee asked Harry A. Bigelow of 
the University of Chicago to prepare a report dealing with “the 
Scope and Classification of the Subject of Property.”4 Bigelow 
responded with a 70-page memo setting forth a blueprint for 
the anticipated project.5 The memo began with a discussion of 
the meaning of property, which Bigelow defined in extremely 
broad terms. Property, he stipulated, refers to the rights of 
persons with respect to “things,” both tangible and intangible, 
which other persons have a duty to respect.6 As defined, 
“property” included not just rights to land and chattels, but 
also security interests, choses in action, personal contracts, 
 
 4 HARRY A. BIGELOW, PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON SCOPE AND 
CLASSIFICATION OF THE SUBJECT “PROPERTY” 2 (A.L.I. 1926) (hereinafter Bigelow 
Memo) (reproducing resolution). 
 5 Id. at 3-4. 
 6 Id. at 5-6. 
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intellectual goods, enforceable promises, and even reputations.7 
The potential domain of property, he concluded, is very broad. 
Bigelow then proceeded to exclude from this broad 
universe various topics that by convention were regarded as 
discrete fields of study. Thus, although the definition was so 
broad that it included contracts, Bigelow acknowledged that 
contracts should be excluded because they would be subject to a 
separate projected Restatement of Contracts.8 Similarly, although 
his definition included intangible rights like reputation, Bigelow 
acknowledged that this should be covered in the Restatement of 
Torts.9 Although Bigelow regarded trusts as being more 
comfortably nested within the field of property, he also 
recommended that trusts be the subject of a separate 
Restatement, given that trusts were studied by scholars who 
specialized in that subject and were not generalists in the field 
of property.10 (George Bogart, a trusts specialist and one of 
Bigelow’s colleagues at Chicago, assisted Bigelow in preparing 
the memo.11) Equity presented a particular puzzle, and Bigelow 
devoted considerable space to considering whether topics like 
specific performance of land sale contracts should be included 
in a Restatement of Property or in a Restatement of Equity, a 
task complicated by uncertainty over whether there was to be a 
Restatement of Equity.12 (No such restatement was ever 
produced, although the ALI did sponsor a path-breaking 
Restatement of Restitution.13) 
Viewed from a distance, Bigelow’s memo was a classic 
power grab: claim authority over everything and then concede 
away discrete subjects where others have staked out turf and 
would resist encroachment. It worked, in the sense that the 
Council tacitly endorsed Bigelow’s effort and appointed him 
Reporter for the Restatement of Property. The strategy was also 
to have decisive effects on the future shape of the restatement 
project. It explains, for example, why wills and estates are 
included under the umbrella of the Restatement of Property, 
whereas trusts are subject to a separate Restatement, even 
 
 7 Id. at 7-9. 
 8 Id. at 8-9. 
 9 Id. at 9-10. 
 10 Id. at 31-32. 
 11 Id. at 2 (noting Bogart’s participation). Bogart later served on the Advisory 
Committee for the First RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS, see RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS 
iii (1935), and, of course, has his name on a prominent treatise devoted to trusts. 
 12 Bigelow Memo, supra note 4, at 28-42. 
 13 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE 
TRUSTS (1937). Warren A. Seavey and Austin W. Scott served as reporters. 
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though, from the perspective of modern legal practice and law 
school curricula, it would make more sense to cover both topics 
in a single Restatement, e.g., “Trusts and Estates.” Both wills 
and trusts fell within Bigelow’s broad definition of “property,” 
but trusts were specifically hived off, whereas wills and estates 
were not. 
Bigelow’s memo was equally fateful in his discussion of 
the order in which topics within the field of property should be 
taken up by the projected Restatement. He argued that the 
first thing to tackle was estates in land and future interests.14 
Only later would the restaters turn to the legal incidents of 
ownership, servitudes, personal property, and intellectual 
property.15 This ordering of priorities goes a long way toward 
explaining the incompleteness of the Restatement of Property, and 
especially the heavy emphasis on land at the expense of personal 
and intangible rights. Estates in land came first, and the ALI 
never got around to restating much of what Bigelow slated for 
coverage at a later time. 
One suspects that Bigelow’s priorities were strongly 
influenced by the law school curriculum of the 1920s, which 
made the estate system derived from English feudalism the 
centerpiece of the study of property.16 Interestingly, however, 
 
 14 Bigelow Memo, supra note 4, at 63-64. 
 15 Id. at 61-64 
 16 These proclivities can be illustrated in instructional materials prepared by 
Bigelow and Powell, separately and jointly. In his 1919 casebook on real property, 
Bigelow’s table of contents consisted of: Chapter I “The Feudal System,” Chapter II 
“Estates,” Chapter III “Nonposessory Interests in Land,” Chapter IV “Joint 
Ownership,” Chapter V “Disseisin and the Remedies Therefor.” 2 HARRY A. BIGELOW, 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1919); see also 2 HARRY A. BIGELOW & 
JOSEPH WARREN MADDEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 
1934). Later, Bigelow and Powell, together with Ralph Aigler, published a famous 
casebook, RALPH A. AIGLER, HARRY A. BIGELOW & RICHARD R. POWELL, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY (Warren A. Seavey ed., 1942), whose Parts are: 1 
“Personal Property,” 2 “Types of Estates in Land,” 3 “Relations Involving Two or More 
Owners of Property,” 4 “Adverse Possession and Prescription,” 5 “Problems in 
Conveyancing.” Part 1, apparently by Bigelow (who had previously published a 
casebook on personal property), engages in a Hohfeldian analysis of the legal protection 
of an owner’s interests in a car, with citations to Hohfeld, Corbin, and Kocourek. Id. at 
2-3. (Later in Chapter 1, a position is staked out that “all legal relations can exist only 
between persons, the legal relations that constitute the law of property concern 
things . . . but a thing cannot have a legal relation.” Id. at 3-4. In contrast to some of 
Bigelow’s statements during the ALI process, the book goes on to develop a general 
account of property as entailing rights good against the world, stating that  
[t]he second characteristic [of property] is that the four relations discussed in 
the preceding paragraphs are all relations between A and an indefinitely 
large number of persons, or as it is sometimes put, “against the world at 
large,” or to use a common but, for the reasons just discussed, misleading 
Latin phrase, “in rem.”  
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Bigelow sought to justify his ordering of topics in a very 
modern way, by generating an empirical study of the relative 
frequency with which different topics in property law appear in 
reported judicial decisions. The empirical study, he suggested, 
supported his recommendation to tackle real property and the 
estate system first.17 Yet an examination of his data, reproduced 
in an appendix to the memo, casts doubt on this.18 Even in the 
1920s, mortgages and liens generated more litigation than 
estates; for that matter, so did personal property disputes (even 
after excluding cases involving sales) and landlord-tenant law.19 
Today, of course, the topic Bigelow put at the forefront has 
declined greatly in significance, and the ones he put off to the 
future have emerged as having even greater importance than 
they had in his day. Rigorous adherence to empiricism would 
have produced a sequencing of topics for the projected 
Restatement much more consistent with future trends. 
Perhaps most significantly, Bigelow’s ambitious agenda 
sowed the seeds of failure. The projected scope of the project was 
so broad that it would take a herculean effort to bring it to 
conclusion. Perhaps Bigelow was Hercules, but we will never 
know, for he resigned his position as Reporter after only two 
years, upon being appointed Dean of the University of Chicago 
Law School.20 His replacement was Richard R. Powell, of 
Columbia Law School, who had also advised on the planning 
memo and was a member of the original Advisory Committee 
on Property.21 
Powell was a natural choice to take over as Reporter. He 
was deeply learned and widely respected in his field. 
Nevertheless, he did not have the temperament needed to execute 
Bigelow’s ambitious program. Powell’s scholarship was 
                                                                                                                                     
Id. at 4. (contrasting this “marked characteristic of property” with the situation in 
contract); see also id. at 5 (generalizing the analysis to real property). Part 2, 
apparently by Powell, includes not only Chapter 7 “Historical Background” but also 
Chapter 14 “Equitable Estates—Uses Prior to 1536”! Id. at 561. To cite another 
example, in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the West Publishing Company published 
five volumes on Property Law by Columbia Law School professors for use in the first 
year curriculum. See RICHARD R. POWELL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF 
POSSESSORY ESTATES (West. Pub. Co. 1933). They were an introductory volume on 
“Possessory Estates,” two volumes on “Trusts and Estates,” a volume on “Vendor and 
Purchaser,” and a volume on “Landlord and Tenant.” Id. at v-vii. All five volumes dealt 
almost exclusively with real property. Id. 
 17 Bigelow Memo, supra note 4, at 14. 
 18 Id. App. at 74-75. The survey was comprised of all reported cases digested 
in the American Digest, Volume 22-A, covering the first four months in 1925. 
 19 Id. 
 20 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY, vol I, introduction x (1936). 
 21 Id. at xi. 
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characterized by an insistence on “meticulous accuracy.”22 He was 
also fascinated by details rooted in English history. Biographical 
sketches of his years at Columbia feature his mastery of the 
Socratic teaching method, including an exchange in which he 
asked a student to explain “[w]hat effect did the Statute of Quia 
Emptores have upon the creation of tenancies in frankalmoign?”23 
Powell’s announced intention, upon taking over as Reporter, was 
to avoid misleading generalities and “particularize extensively,” 
although he admitted that this “has the disadvantage of 
restricting the immediate aid rendered by the Institute to quite 
narrow fields in the Law of Property.”24 Powell was neither a 
theorist nor a reformer by temperament. He recognized that the 
law evolved, but it did so slowly, and in order to understand the 
law one had to start with history. Although it would be 
inaccurate to characterize Powell as a legal formalist of the sort 
associated with Christopher Columbus Langdell, he 
unquestionably regarded the restatement enterprise as one in 
which the committee’s task was to uncover the superior “rule” 
implicit in existing legal sources. 
This rule-based and historically-grounded orientation is 
highly visible in the first four volumes of the Restatement 
produced under Powell’s supervision. Perhaps the most telling 
example is Chapter 5, for which Powell was solely responsible, 
which spends 127 pages explicating “Fees Tail and Related 
Estates.”25 The fee tail had been abolished in virtually every 
state for over one hundred years when the Restatement was 
prepared. The chapter is therefore devoted to explicating the 
estates into which the fee tail was converted under different 
statutes in different states, and the case law interpreting these 
statutes. The result was definitive. But given the obscurity of the 
topic, its fundamental irrelevance, and the impossibility of stating 
a single rule for all jurisdictions, this was surely a misplaced 
commitment of resources for a Restatement, especially given all 
the other items waiting on Bigelow’s agenda. 
Whether it was due to the change in leadership, or to 
Powell’s insistence on a meticulous elaboration of the old estate 
 
 22 John Ritchie, III, Book Review, 63 HARV. L. REV. 732, 734 (1950) 
(reviewing RICHARD R. POWELL, I THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1st ed. 1949)). 
 23 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW COLUMBIA 
UNIVERSITY 268 (1955); see also Text of the Resolution of the Columbia University 
Faculty of Law in Honor of Richard Roy Belden Power on the Occasion of his 
Retirement, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 105 (1960). 
 24 Richard R. Powell, Restatement of the Law of Property, 16 A.B.A. J. 197, 
198 (1930). 
 25 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY §§ 59-106 (1936). 
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system, the Restatement of Property soon lagged badly behind 
other restatement efforts. The first two volumes did not appear 
in print until 1936, well after Agency, Contracts, Torts, and 
other efforts had made their initial debut.26 At some point in 
the mid-1930s, William Draper Lewis, the Executive Director 
of the ALI, became alarmed. In 1935, the decision was made to 
transfer a group of property specialists working on the legal 
incidents of ownership, under the leadership of Everett Fraser of 
the University of Minnesota Law School, from the Restatement of 
Property to the Restatement of Torts.27 This explains why a 
collection of topics denominated “natural rights in land”—
including nuisance, lateral and subjacent support, and riparian 
water rights—appears in Volume IV of the Restatement of Torts, 
rather than in the Restatement of Property. 
By the time Powell delivered the first two volumes of 
the Restatement of Property in 1936, a further decision was 
made to subdivide the property working group. Powell would 
continue to lead “Group 1,” explicating the constructional 
principles that govern estates in land and future interests and 
the Rule Against Perpetuities. A new “Group 2,” under the 
leadership of Oliver Rundell of the University of Wisconsin Law 
School, would tackle servitudes.28 Powell delivered his third 
volume, on constructional principles, in 1940, and a fourth and 
final volume, on the Rule Against Perpetuities and related 
restrictions on the creation of property interests, in 1944. 
Rundell also completed the work on servitudes in 1944.29 After 
that, World War II ended the original restatement project. 
Although Torts and Contracts were relatively complete efforts, 
the Restatement of Property covered only estates in land and 
servitudes. If one looked into the Restatement of Torts, one 
could find significant additional material relevant to property, 
including a fairly complete treatment of the right to exclude and 
privileges overriding the right to exclude30 and the incidents of 
 
 26 Volumes 1 and 2 of the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS appeared in 
1932; volumes 1 and 2 of the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY appeared in 1933; 
volumes 1 and 2 of the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS appeared in 1934; the 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW appeared in 1934; and volumes 1 and 2 of 
the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS appeared in 1935. 
 27 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS vii, intro. (1939) 
 28 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY, vol 1, introduction xiii (1936). 
 29 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY: FUTURE INTERESTS CONTINUED AND 
CONCLUDED (1940); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY: SOCIAL RESTRICTIONS 
IMPOSED ON THE CREATION OF PROPERTY INTERESTS (1944); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
PROPERTY: SERVITUDES (1944). 
 30 Volume I of the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS includes very extensive 
coverage of basic rights in property and exceptions thereto. Chapter 7, covering 40 
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ownership covered by Fraser’s ad hoc group transferred from 
Property to Torts. But the balance of Bigelow’s ambitious agenda, 
including landlord-tenant, mortgages and liens, all of personal 
property, and intellectual property went untouched. 
When the ALI decided to revive the Restatement of 
Property project in 1970, Powell was again appointed to the 
advisory committee, but the position of Reporter went to A. 
James Casner of Harvard Law School.31 Casner was a protégée 
of Powell’s, having obtained a J.S.D. degree from Columbia 
under Powell’s supervision while a young scholar on leave from 
Maryland Law School. Powell was sufficiently impressed by his 
student that he had Casner appointed to the Advisory 
Committee for the Restatement of Property, where he worked on 
Chapter 7, which dealt with class gifts (the topic of his 
dissertation), and prepared the index for volumes I and II.32 
Casner made important contacts as the junior member of the 
advisory committee, especially in developing a close friendship 
with Barton Leach of Harvard Law School. Leach later secured 
Casner a visiting professorship at Harvard, which turned into 
an offer of tenure.33 After serving as an intelligence officer in 
World War II, Casner returned to Harvard. He and Powell 
briefly discussed collaborating on a property treatise, but 
Powell decided to develop a treatise on his own, which still bears 
his name.34 Casner then put together a team of authors to produce 
the American Law of Property, which was effectively a competing 
treatise to Powell’s.35 Casner and Leach also collaborated on a 
popular property casebook.36 Casner maintained close ties with 
                                                                                                                                     
pages, covers “Invasions of the Interest in the Exclusive Possession of Land and its 
Physical Condition (Trespass on Land)”; Chapter 8, covering 149 pages, deals with 
“Privileged Entries on Land”; Chapter 9, covering 88 pages, treats “Intentional 
Invasions of Interests in the Present and Future Possession of Chattels”; and Chapter 
10, covering 46 pages, addresses “Privileges Intentionally to Invade Interests in 
Present and Future Possession of Chattels.” This material is covered in only the most 
cursory fashion in torts casebooks today and the material is more likely to be 
encountered in basic property law courses. 
 31 The information on Casner and his tenure as Reporter of the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY has been gleaned from an historical video interview with Casner 
produced by the ALI in 1990. ALI Audiovisual History—A. James Casner, (A.L.I. 1990), 
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QTH1q5B_1nk&list=PL1C004D53890D3AA1. 
 32 Id. at 02:03-06:25; 24:20-24:28. 
 33 Id. at 09:30-14:47. 
 34 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY (1st ed. 1949). The 
current edition, a loose-leaf treatise published in 17 volumes, is Powell on Real 
Property (Michael Allen Wolf, general ed., 2013). 
 35 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE 
UNITED STATES (A. James Casner ed., 1952). 
 36 A. JAMES CASNER & W. BARTON LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY (1st 
ed. 1950). 
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the ALI during this period, serving as Reporter for a Restatement 
of Estate and Gift Taxation before also being appointed the new 
Reporter for Property.37 
Casner lacked Bigelow’s theoretical bent, and did not 
share Powell’s scholarly fascination with historically-derived 
rules. He was, by temperament, a reformer. Casner had stirred 
up the tax bar with his proposal for a one-time generation-
skipping tax based on life expectancies as part of his work on 
estate and gift taxes.38 When asked for his advice about how to 
proceed with a new restatement of property, Casner argued that 
the first task should be landlord-tenant law.39 He reasoned, 
sensibly enough, that the First Restatement had said virtually 
nothing about this area of property law. But he was also 
motivated by the awareness that landlord-tenant law was a hot 
topic at the time among those agitating for legal reform to 
assist the poor, and he saw the Restatement as a means for 
lending weight to these efforts.40 
Casner’s effort to use the Restatement as a vehicle for 
landlord-tenant reform proved to be highly controversial. The 
advisory committee included a number of practicing lawyers 
who specialized in negotiating commercial leases;41 they were 
skeptical about the need for implied warranties of habitability 
and rules mandating that landlords mitigate damages when 
tenants abandon leaseholds.42 Casner also had to contend with 
Charles J. Meyers, of Stanford Law School, who argued, following 
the tenets of the nascent law and economics movement, that 
mandatory tenant rights would diminish the supply of rental 
units and increase prices.43 
After seven years of wrangling, two volumes on 
landlord-tenant law emerged in 1977. The final product 
reflected a compromise between Casner and the reformers on 
the one hand and the skeptics on the other. For example, the 
Restatement endorsed the implied warranty of habitability, but 
said it could be waived by landlords in return for consideration 
 
 37 ALI Audiovisual History, supra note 31, at 44:11-44:30. 
 38 Id. at 44:32-45:50; 47:13-47:55. 
 39 Id. at 49:15-51:01. 
 40 Id. at 50:25-52:02. 
 41 In contrast to the FIRST RESTATEMENT, which was dominated by academics, 
Casner was the only academic on the landlord-tenant volumes. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT ix, intro. (1977). The other committee members were 
either practitioners or judges. Id. 
 42 See ALI Audiovisual History, supra note 31, at 52:16-53:09. 
 43 Charles J. Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability and the American Law 
Institute, 27 STAN. L. REV. 879, 893 (1975). 
2014] WHY RESTATE THE BUNDLE? 691 
 
provided such a waiver was not “unconscionable or significantly 
against public policy.”44 As a result, the Restatement’s landlord-
tenant volumes did not satisfy either the reformers or the 
skeptics. Overall, these volumes have had comparatively little 
impact on the law. 
After the landlord-tenant project was done, Casner 
convinced the ALI to undertake a series of volumes on 
“Donative Transfers”—essentially wills and estates.45 Again, 
there was logic to this, since Bigelow’s original blueprint had 
hived off trusts but implicitly left wills and estates within the 
domain of property. It was no coincidence, however, that estate 
planning had become the central concern of Casner’s own 
scholarly efforts, while his interest in basic property law had 
waned. Casner never revised the American Law of Property after 
it was published in 1952-54, and no supplement was produced 
after 1977.46 Instead, he devoted his scholarly energies largely to a 
multi-volume treatise on estate planning.47 Once again, 
Casner’s reforming impulse dictated the agenda. This time, his 
initial target was the venerable Rule Against Perpetuities. 
The First Restatement had considered the Rule Against 
Perpetuities in Volume IV, where Powell had produced a typically 
thorough restatement of the conventional understanding of the 
Rule, derived from John Chipman Gray’s treatise on the subject.48 
The traditional rule, as explicated by Powell and before him Gray, 
was complex and a potential trap for those not advised by the 
best lawyers. But it had the virtue of allowing the validity of 
future interests to be determined as soon as a conveyance took 
effect, because the Rule was applied by considering all possible 
future contingencies (“what might happen”). Casner, prodded 
by his colleague Barton Leach, was a proponent of changing the 
Rule by considering what actually did happen (“wait and 
see”).49 This reform had the virtue of eliminating some very 
low-probability scenarios easily overlooked by lawyers (fertile 
octogenarians, unborn widows, and the like), but at the price of 
 
 44 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 5.6 (1977). 
 45 See ALI Audiovisual History, supra note 31, at 57:25-59:13. 
 46 Id., at 1:07:16-1:08:37. 
 47 A. JAMES CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING: CASES, STATUTES, TEXT, AND OTHER 
MATERIALS (1st ed. 1953). 
 48 JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (1st ed. Boston, 
Little, Brown, & Co.1886). 
 49 ALI Audiovisual History, supra note 31, at 59:19-59:55, 1:01:51-1:02:56. 
Leach had long been a critic of the traditional rule, largely on the ground that it 
generated unfair surprises. See, e.g., Barton Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending 
the Rule’s Reign of Terror, 65 HARV. L. REV. 721, 730 (1952). 
692 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:2 
creating long periods of uncertainty, which could impair the 
alienability of property. 
Casner’s advocacy of “wait and see” triggered an 
emphatic rebuke by his former mentor Powell, in a dramatic 
confrontation at the ALI annual meeting.50 The gist of the Powell 
critique was that wait and see “leaves the location of who owns 
what unascertainable for the entire period of the rule.”51 Others 
pointed out that wait and see had been adopted by only a small 
number of jurisdictions, and that no intervening change in 
circumstances had occurred since 1944 that would justify 
eliminating the traditional rule.52 Casner nevertheless prevailed a 
year later, and “wait and see” was officially endorsed by the ALI 
with the publication of the Restatement (Second) of Property: 
Donative Transfers in 1983.53 The reform was eventually 
adopted by a significant number of states, although more 
through adoption by state legislatures of the Uniform Statutory 
Rule Against Perpetuities, rather than through judicial 
revision relying on the Restatement.54 In fact, some state courts 
have rejected “wait and see” on the ground that such a reform 
was the province of the legislature, not the courts.55 
Casner soldiered on as Reporter for another decade, 
producing successive volumes on estate planning, namely powers 
of appointment (1986), class gifts (Casner’s dissertation topic) 
(1988), and gifts (1992).56 He made no move to fill the other gaps 
in property that remained under Bigelow’s original plan. 
The Casner era marked a decisive turn away from the 
conception of the Restatement as a distillation of the law as it is, 
to a view of the Restatement as a vehicle for laying down the law 
as it should be. Something similar happened in other 
Restatements in the second series, for example Prosser’s 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, with its advocacy of strict products 
liability.57 In an interview conducted near the end of his life, 
 
 50 A.L.I., 55TH ANNUAL MEETING: PROCEEDINGS 1978 at 250-56, 285-86 (1979). 
 51 Id. at 251. 
 52 E.g., id. at 258 (comments of Louis Lusky); id. at 267 (comments of 
Laurence H. Eldredge). 
 53 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.4 (1983); 
see id. at viii. 
 54 HELENE SHAPO ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 214, at n.28 (2011). 
 55 E.g., Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Props., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 799, 808 
(N.Y. 1996). 
 56 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS, div. II, pt. V 
(1986) (Powers of Appointment); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS, div. II, pt. VI (1988) (Class Gifts); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: 
DONATIVE TRANSFERS, div. III (1992) (Requirements for Effectuating a Donative Transfer). 
 57 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
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Casner forthrightly defended the conception of the Restatement 
as an instrument of legal reform.58 He acknowledged that it was 
difficult to draw the line between restatement-style reform, which 
implicitly invites the judiciary to change the law, and reform 
produced by promulgating uniform laws, which target the 
legislature as the appropriate instrument of legal change.59 But 
Casner betrayed no doubt about the propriety of asking 
committees of lawyers, headed by law professors, to agitate for 
legal reform under the guise of “restating” the law. 
Epistemological modesty was not part of his makeup. 
When the ALI decided to launch a third series of 
property restatements, it abandoned the practice of appointing 
a single reporter to oversee the effort. Instead, the ALI decided 
that henceforth it would appoint different reporters to head up 
different topics within the field of property. This approach 
recognized the reality that a single reporter was unlikely to have 
the time and energy, not to mention the expertise, to oversee a 
vast area like property (especially as staked out by Bigelow). Both 
Powell and Casner, in their different ways, had settled on discrete 
areas within the field of property that reflected their own 
research interests, without venturing into more unfamiliar 
territory. Nevertheless, the appointment of specialists to oversee 
particular topics probably accentuated the trend toward using the 
Restatements as platforms for pushing reform. Specialists are 
likely to have strong views about the right and wrong ways to 
approach a topic, and to see their position of leadership as an 
occasion to advance the right and the good. 
The Third Restatement of Property would devote its 
attention to three different topics. The first—mortgages—filled a 
glaring gap left by the First and Second Restatements, and was 
ably executed by Reporters Grant Nelson and Dale Whitman.60 
The other two topics were overtly reformist. Ironically, both 
sought to replow ground that had already been covered in the 
First and Second Restatements of Property. In effect, the ALI, in 
its zeal to advance particular conceptions of desirable legal 
reform, began to cannibalize its own prior efforts at reform. 
The first of the new reformist efforts was the Restatement 
(Third) of Property: Servitudes, published in two volumes in 2000. 
The ALI had already restated servitudes, in Volume V of the First 
 
 58 ALI Audiovisual History, supra note 31, at 1:08:38-1:11:20. 
 59 Id. at 1:13:13-1:13:54. 
 60 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES (1997). 
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Restatement, under Reporter Oliver Rundell.61 This was a 
quintessential effort to restate the law as it is, with all its quirks 
and curlicues. The reporter for the new servitudes project, Susan 
French, and her colleagues were eager to streamline and 
rationalize the law. Since most servitudes—whether they are 
easements, covenants, licenses, or profits—originate in some 
contractual undertaking, the new Restatement advocated the 
adoption of a very contract-like conception of servitudes, 
centered on the intent of the original contracting parties and 
subject to standard contractual defenses like restraint of trade, 
unconscionability, and violation of public policy.62 Old 
requirements, like privity of estate and touch and concern, 
designed to limit the promises that could be imposed on non-
consenting future owners, were unceremoniously tossed aside.63 
Whatever the merits of this reconceptualization as a proposal 
for legislative reform, it was apparently too radical for the 
courts. To date, the courts have largely ignored the reforms 
urged by the Restatement (Third) of Servitudes and have 
instead continued to apply the “outmoded” common law in 
determining when servitudes run with the land.64 
The other reformist effort appeared under the title 
Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative 
Transfers, which appeared in volumes released between 1999 
and 2011 under the leadership of Reporter Lawrence Waggoner 
and Associate Reporter John Langbein.65 The reader will recall 
that Casner produced four volumes under a similar title as part 
of the Second Restatement of Property, the last volume of which 
was released in 1992. The best explanation for the new series 
of volumes is simply that the new Reporters disagreed with the 
previous Reporter on a number of fronts and were eager to 
advance their own preferred positions. Perhaps most strikingly, 
the Third Restatement repudiated Casner’s “wait and see” reform 
of the Rule Against Perpetuities, offering up yet another version 
 
 61 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES (1944). 
 62 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES §§ 2.2, 3.1, 3.6, 3.7 (2000). 
 63 Id. at ch. V, introductory note; § 3.2. As the Executive Director observed 
when the volumes were released, “[t]he large ideas in this Restatement are very 
different from those that governed its predecessor.” Id. at ix. 
 64 THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 1041-42 (2d ed. 2012); Note, Touch and Concern, the Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes, and a Proposal, 122 HARV. L. REV. 938, 944-45 (2009). 
 65 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS (1999); 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS (2003); 3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS (2011). 
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of the Rule Against Perpetuities.66 Under the Waggoner-Langbein 
proposed reform, the Rule would prohibit any conditional gift for 
the benefit of persons born more than two generations after the 
transferor.67 Ironically, by the time the Third Restatement 
repudiated “wait and see,” it had become the majority rule. No 
state, however, had ever adopted the Waggoner-Langbein two-
generation proposal. It was offered up as a pure reform, with 
no pretense of restating the law at all.68 
We agree with Waggoner and Langbein that some form 
of the Rule Against Perpetuities is desirable, and we agree with 
their rejection of Casner’s version of the “wait and see” reform. 
But the ALI is now on record as endorsing three different 
versions of the Rule Against Perpetuities. This has occurred 
during a period when the Rule has been abolished or severely 
curtailed in many states in an effort to attract trust business.69 
The idea that yet another reform of the Rule endorsed by the 
ALI will staunch its evisceration by special interest legislation 
is fanciful. By the time the ALI has restated itself three times, 
any credibility it can claim based on expert knowledge of 
existing legal authority has evaporated. Its pronouncements 
will be regarded as having no more authority than proposals 
for reform appearing in a law review. 
This brief overview suggests that much of the failure of 
the Restatement of Property can be laid to accidents of history. 
Bigelow’s scoping of the project in extremely broad terms, his 
resignation as Reporter before significant progress had been 
made, Powell’s slow and meticulous leadership animated by his 
fascination with historical obscurities, Casner’s dogged pursuit of 
particular reforms at the expense of all else, the fragmentation of 
 
 66 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS, ch. 27, introductory note (2010). Reporter Waggoner had previously been 
supportive of the wait and see approach, but had urged the adoption of a fixed number 
of years as the waiting period rather than the traditional lives in being plus 21 years. 
See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Perpetuities: A Perspective on Wait-and-See, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1714, 1714 (1985). 
 67 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 27.1 
 68 Reporter Waggoner has acknowledged that the new position on 
perpetuities “is aspirational.” Lawrence W. Waggoner, What’s in the Third and Final 
Volume of the New Restatement of Property that Estate Planners Should Know About, 
38 ACTEC L.J. 23, 42 (2012). He justifies this on the ground that perpetuities law is 
“now statutory,” so “[i]f the Restatement is to be successful in shaping the law, it will 
have to be through legislation.” Id. at 42-43. This ignores that perpetuities law, even if 
embodied in legislation, draws on common law concepts, which in turn require judicial 
interpretation. In any event, it is an acknowledgment that the Restatement has taken 
on a role indistinguishable from an editorial supporting law reform. 
 69 Robert Sitkoff & Max Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust 
Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356 (2005). 
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authority among multiple Reporters for the third round, and the 
overtly reformist rather than “restatist” aspirations of the 
volumes produced in the third round—all of these factors 
contributed to the production of 17 volumes that receive 
relatively little attention from lawyers and scholars, and have 
had little influence with the courts.70 
II. THE HOHFELDIAN FOUNDATION OF THE RESTATEMENT 
OF PROPERTY 
We have yet to consider the most interesting aspect of 
the history of the Restatement of Property, namely, that it was 
originally conceived as an implementation of the typology of 
legal concepts introduced by a Yale Law Professor named 
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld. Although Hohfeld wrote less than 
voluminously and died at the age of 39 in 1918, his ideas had a 
pronounced influence on legal scholars, especially in the inter-
War period. Hohfeld engaged in what today would be called 
conceptual analysis. His most famous contribution was to 
break apart the concept of “right” into four distinct ideas—
right, privilege, power, and immunity—each having its own 
“correlate” and “opposite.”71 He also criticized the distinction 
between in personam and in rem rights, arguing that all rights 
pertain to relations among persons, rather than relations of 
persons to things.72 
Hohfeld himself can claim some credit for the formation 
of the American Law Institute. He gave a speech to the ABA 
annual meeting in 1914 urging the formation of an institution 
devoted to clarifying and harmonizing the law.73 Although he 
 
 70 We make no attempt here to test the positive theory of “private 
legislatures” put forward by Alan Schwartz and Bob Scott, which emphasizes the 
informational advantages of reformers and special interest groups relative to the 
general membership of such lawmaking bodies. Alan Schwarz & Robert E. Scott, The 
Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 597 (1995). Broadly 
speaking, however, it is our impression that in the field of property the “reformers,” i.e. 
law professors, have played a more significant role than have interest groups. The 
landlord-tenant volumes may be a partial exception. 
 71 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28-59 (1913). 
 72 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 718-33 (1917). 
 73 N. E. H. Hull, Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins 
of the American Law Institute, 8 L. & HIST. REV. 55, 58-59 (1990). The address, entitled “A 
Vital School of Jurisprudence and Law: Have American Universities Awakened to the 
Enlarged Opportunities and Responsibilities of the Present Day?,” is reproduced in WESLEY 
NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL 
REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 332-84 (Walter Wheeler Cook, ed., 1923).  
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died before this vision was realized, some of the founders of the 
ALI, most importantly William Draper Lewis, the first 
Executive Director, were enamored of the notion that Hohfeld’s 
“scientific” terminology might help bring greater clarity to the 
law.74 Bigelow was of the same mind, having engaged in 
Hohfeldian analysis in some of his previous scholarship.75 
Immediately upon being appointed Reporter for the Restatement 
of Property, Bigelow set about drafting a proposed Chapter 1 
devoted to setting forth precise definitions of “general terms” to be 
used in restating the law of property.76 That chapter tracks 
Hohfeld’s conceptual analysis of fundamental legal terms so 
closely it could almost be described as a Restatement of Hohfeld.77 
The Hohfeldian roots of Chapter 1 were confirmed at a 
meeting of the ALI Council in 1929. When a council member 
remarked on the close resemblance between the definitions in 
Chapter 1 and Hohfeld’s fundamental legal concepts, Bigelow 
acknowledged that “[w]ith modifications we very definitely took 
Mr. Hohfeld’s ideas as the basis upon which we framed these 
 
 74 G. Edward White, The American Law Institute and the Triumph of 
Modernist Jurisprudence, 15 L. & HIST. REV. 1, 30 (1997). White argues that Hull 
exaggerates Hohfeld’s reformist agenda, id. at 28 n.80 (contrasting N.E.H. Hull, Vital 
Schools of Jurisprudence: Roscoe Pound, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, and the Promotion of an 
Academic Jurisprudential Agenda, 1910–1919, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 235, 270 (1995)), and that 
there is little to no evidence that the early restaters understood the Hohfeldian system or its 
subversive implications. Id. at 29. But see also Hull, supra note 73. 
 75 See Harry A. Bigelow, The Content of Covenants in Leases, 12 MICH. L. 
REV. 639, 640 (1913) (citing Hohfeld); Harry A. Bigelow & J.W. Madden, Exception and 
Reservation of Easements, 38 HARV. L. REV. 180, 185-88 (1924). In his famous article on 
covenants, Bigelow also cites two of Hohfeld’s antecedents in analyzing rights and 
privileges, Terry and Salmond. Bigelow, The Content of Covenants in Leases, supra at 640 
n.5, 641 nn.13-14. He did the same in an early speech on easements, Harry A. Bigelow, 
Natural Easements, 9 U. ILL. L. REV. 541, 543 n.7, 544 n.8, 10 (1915). Bigelow’s discussion in 
this speech suggests a familiarity with Hohfeld’s unique contributions: 
First [the owner] has what are ordinarily called privileges or permissive 
rights with respect to the land, i.e., he may use it as he sees fit; he may dig in 
it; erect buildings on it, cultivate it, or he may let it lie idle and do nothing 
with it: in fact the privileges of user of an owner of land are so varied that it 
is useless to attempt to enumerate them. It will be noticed that there are no 
duties on the part of other members of society correlative to these privilges 
[sic], the relation of any such other member is purely negative. All that can 
be said is that no right of his is violated by the landowner’s exercising any of 
these privileges. 
Id. at 543. Interestingly, in this passage, Bigelow recognizes that the open-ended set of 
privileges is not (effectively cannot be) delineated directly. Id. He also discusses how “[i]n 
addition to these privileges of user any given landowner has certain rights in the narrow 
sense, i.e. legal relations that imply correlative duties on the part of other members of 
society.” Id. This was before Hohfeld published his analysis of in rem rights. 
 76 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY ch. 1 (1936). 
 77 Id. 
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definitions.”78 Immediately after Bigelow acknowledged the 
debt to Hohfeld, Lewis chimed in: 
[T]he importance to the Institute of these first five Sections is very 
wide. We started the Restatement of the law of Property very largely 
to be sure that in the use of these terms describing fundamental 
concepts of the law we were correct, and we asked the Property 
group to work them out. They have done so and their conclusions are 
quite a compelling force with the other Reporters.79 
Lewis later added that the first chapter of Property had been 
circulated to all reporters of other subjects and with the 
exhortation to use the words “as Mr. Bigelow has used them in 
this Tentative Draft.”80 
Bigelow proceeded to offer a spirited defense of the 
Restatement’s adoption of Hohfeld’s four different definitions of 
“right.” He explained that “[w]hat we are trying to do is to make 
as scientific an exposition as we can of the law of real property” 
and that the first step in doing so was “to free ourselves from the 
ambiguities and the inexactness of expression that would exist if 
we did not differentiate these various meanings of the word 
right.”81 A particularly telling exchange occurred when one of 
the council members, a Mr. Beers, challenged the accuracy of 
the definitions on the ground that there was no mention of the 
idea that property “is a right against all persons, against all 
the world.”82 One of Hohfeld’s views, contrary to conventional 
understanding, was that rights in rem or “against the world” 
could be cashed out in terms of clusters of in personam rights.83 
Channeling Hohfeld, Bigelow replied that “I do not believe that 
there is any such thing as a right against the world at large, 
against everybody.”84 He acknowledged that one could have 
identical rights against different individuals. But it is also 
possible that the rights “may vary according to the man.”85 He 
was adamant that, “accurately speaking,” there was “no such 
 
 78 Harry A. Bigelow & Richard R. Powell, Discussion of Property Tentative 
Draft No. 1, 7 A.L.I. PROC. 199, 207 (1929). The only “modification” appears to be the 
substitution of the phase “absence of right” for Hohfeld’s “no-right.” Id. at 210-11. 
 79 Id. at 207. 
 80 Id. at 209. 
 81 Id. at 213-14. 
 82 Id. at 211. 
 83 Specifically, he argued that “in rem” rights were better seen as “multital,” 
which means a cluster of many “unital” or one-on-one right-duty pairs, whereas 
“paucital” rights were clusters of few unital rights. Hohfeld, supra note 72, at 718-33. 
For discussion, see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract 
Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 780-89 (2001). 
 84 Bigelow & Powell, supra note 78, at 215. 
 85 Id. 
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thing as a right against the world at large, or as the older 
authorities said, in rem.”86 In the last analysis, he said, there is  
nothing but a series of rights against various specified individuals 
and ordinarily while it is accurate to say you have got a right against 
everybody, against the world at large, yet when you come to the 
Restatement where it becomes essential to analyze your right more 
carefully, I do not want to find ourselves committed to the 
proposition that there is such a thing as a right against the world at 
large or against an indeterminably large number of people.87 
Bigelow was arguably not entirely successful in 
extirpating any reference to rights “in rem” from the first draft 
of Chapter 1. The persistent Mr. Beers noted that “interests in 
land” was defined as rights “against the members of society in 
general not to be interfered with in respect of the land.”88 He 
pointedly asked whether the latter notion was not the same as a 
right “against the world at large.”89 Bigelow responded that the 
phrase “against members of society in general” was intended “to 
cover the meaning of the old phrase ‘in rem’ which I have 
discarded.”90 He insisted, however, that “rights against members 
of society in general” did not mean the same thing as rights 
“universally applicable.”91 Later, the reference to ownership of 
land including rights against “members of society in general” 
was changed into a definition of “possessory interests in land,” 
avoiding any suggestion that rights of “ownership” might entail 
universal duties.92 
The Hohfeldian ideas in Chapter 1 survived the skeptical 
questioning by the Council. After he took over as Reporter in 1929, 
Powell showed no inclination to tinker with Bigelow’s handiwork. 
As published in 1936, much of Chapter 1 reads as if it were drafted 
by Hohfeld himself. Consider the four opening sections: 
 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 218. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 217-18. The new definition of “Possessory Interests in Land” was 
modified to read: “a physical relation to the land of a kind which gives a certain degree 
of physical control over the land, and an intent so to exercise such control as to exclude 
other members of society in general from any present occupation of the land.” 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY: POSSESSORY INTERESTS IN LAND § 7 (1936). Given 
that ownership of land generally entails possession, or at least the right to determine 
who has possession, the concession that possession entails rights against the world 
would seem to imply that ownership does too. 
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§ 1. Right. 
A right, as the word is used in this Restatement, is a legally 
enforceable claim of one person against another, that the other shall 
do a given act or shall not do a given act. 
Comment: 
Correlative duty. * * * 
§ 2. Privilege. 
A privilege, as the word is used in this Restatement, is a legal 
freedom on the part of one person as against another to do a given 
act or a legal freedom not to do a given act. 
Comment: 
a. Correlative absence of right. * * * 
§ 3. Power. 
A power, as the word is used in this Restatement, is an 
ability on the part of a person to produce a change in a given legal 
relation by doing or not doing a given act. 
Comment: 
a. Correlative liability. * * * 
§ 4. Immunity. 
An immunity, as the word is used in this Restatement, is a freedom on 
the part of one person against having a given legal relation altered by a 
given act or omission to act on the part of another person. 
Comment: 
a. Correlative disability. * * *93 
 
How far the adoption of Hohfeldian terminology in chapter 
1 affected the balance of the content of the original Restatement of 
Property is open to question. The first two volumes of the 
Restatement of Property, produced by Powell with Bigelow looking 
over his shoulder, display a conscientious effort to deploy the 
Hohfeldian definitions set forth in Chapter 1.94 But after 
 
 93 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY §§ 1-4 (1936). 
 94 One can cite any number of instances in the first volume of the 
Restatement in which the Hohfeldian vocabulary is utilized. Some examples: 
 
2014] WHY RESTATE THE BUNDLE? 701 
 
Chapter 1, the First Restatement quickly plunged into explicating 
the various estates in land and future interests, more or less 
following conventional understandings. In these provisions it is 
difficult to discern any substantive impact associated with the use 
of Hohfeldian terminology, whether it achieved any clarifying 
effect or not. 
Whatever its impact on the First Restatement of 
Property, the hopes of Executive Director Lewis that Chapter 1 
of the Restatement of Property would serve as a template for 
the adoption of a consistent “scientific” terminology throughout 
all Restatements were not realized. In 1933, George Farnum, 
himself an enthusiastic proponent of Hohfeldian terminology, 
undertook an analysis of the emerging work product of the ALI 
with a view to determining whether Hohfeldian language was 
being adopted consistently.95 Farnum gave high marks to the 
Restatement of Property and to the Restatement of Business 
Associations, where Lewis himself was serving as Reporter.96 
                                                                                                                                     
§ 24. Condition Subsequent. 
 The term “condition subsequent” denotes that part of the language of a 
conveyance, by virtue of which upon the occurrence of a stated event the 
conveyor, or his successor in interest, has the power to terminate the interest 
which has been created subject to the condition subsequent, but which will 
continue until this power is exercised. 
. . . . 
§ 49. Privilege to Use the Affected Land. 
 The privilege of the owner of a possessory estate in fee simple defeasible 
to use the land is identical with that of an owner of a possessory estate in fee 
simple absolute, except that the privilege is limited by a duty not to commit 
waste. 
. . . . 
§ 53. Liability to Condemnation. 
 The liability of an owner of an estate in fee simple defeasible to have his 
interest taken under eminent domain proceedings is identical with that of an 
owner of a estate in fee simple absolute. 
. . . . 
§ 147. Liability to Creditors 
 Except as modified by the rules of law of trusts, a creditor of a person 
who has an estate for life has the power to subject such estate to the payment 
of his claim. The owner of an estate for life has a liability corresponding to 
this power. 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY §§ 24, 49, 53, 147 (1936). 
 95 George R. Farnum, Terminology and the American Law Institute, 13 B.U. 
L. REV. 203, 208-09 (1933). 
 96 Id. at 211. 
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With respect to the Restatement of Contracts, Farnum 
identified inconsistencies, especially with respect to the use of 
the term “liability.”97 He attributed this to the fact that 
Contracts was a collaboration between Reporter Samuel 
Williston, a Hohfeldian skeptic, and Special Advisor Arthur 
Corbin, an enthusiast.98 The Restatement of Trusts, under the 
leadership of Austin Scott, was disappointing. “It is difficult to 
detect any pronounced trace of Hohfeld’s influence.”99 The 
Restatement of Agency was a project in which Farnum thought 
“the Hohfeldian terminology could be utilized to particular 
advantage.”100 Nevertheless, the original Reporter, Floyd 
Mechem, was indifferent to Hohfeld, and his replacement, 
Warren Seavey, had made only modest efforts to redress this 
deficiency.101 The Reporter for the Restatement of Torts, Francis 
Bohlen, was openly critical of Hohfeld, and insisted on using 
terms “quite at odds with their Hohfeldian definition.”102 As for 
the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, under the direction of 
Reporter Joseph Beale, the influence of Hohfeld “is nowhere 
apparent.”103 All this was deeply disappointing to Farnum, who 
identified the work of the ALI as the “arena in which the 
decisive battle over the practical value of the Hohfeldian 
terminology seems to be in progress.”104 
Farnum’s analysis shows that the attempt to impose 
Hohfeldian language on the restatement project as a whole 
never got off the ground. There were too many strong-willed 
reporters who had their own ideas, and Lewis had insufficient 
leverage to insist they rewrite their work product to incorporate 
an uncongenial vocabulary. As Lewis was forced to concede in a 
Council discussion on the initial draft of the Restatement of 
Conflicts of Laws, “there was no insistence on a uniform legal 
terminology throughout all the Restatements.”105 
Not surprisingly, Hohfeldian terminology did not even 
survive within the Restatement of Property. Powell felt an 
obligation to adhere to Bigelow’s effort to prescribe Hohfeldian 
 
 97 Id. at 213. 
 98 Id. at 212-13. For Corbin’s enthusiasm, see Arthur L. Corbin, Forward, in 
HOHFELD, supra note 73. 
 99 Farnum, supra note 95, at 214. 
 100 Id. at 215. 
 101 Id. at 215-16. 
 102 Id. at 216. 
 103 Id. at 217. 
 104 Id. at 208. 
 105 Id. at 209 (citing Formal statement of Director, Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 26 (1934)). 
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definitions in the First Restatement. But Casner had no interest 
in Hohfeld, nor did any of his successors as Reporters for the 
Third Restatement. Consider, for example, the following from the 
Restatement (Second) of Property: Donative Transfers (1983): 
§ 5.1 Basis for Determining Validity of Restraints on 
Personal Conduct. 
Unless contrary to public policy or violative of some rule of law, a 
provision in a donative transfer which is designed to prevent the 
acquisition or retention of an interest in property in the event of any 
failure on the part of the transferee to comply with a restraint on 
personal conduct is valid.106 
If a Hohfeldian had written this section, it would speak 
in terms of powers and liabilities, but these terms do not 
appear. By the time we get to the Third Restatement, the 
deviations are even more striking. This is taken from 
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes: 
§ 2.18 Acquisition of Servitudes by Governmental 
Bodies and the Public . . . 
(2) Unless application of the rules set forth in 4.1 through 4.2 leads 
to a different conclusion as to the intention of the parties creating a 
servitude, the right to control a servitude for the benefit of the public 
is located in the state and the right to use the servitude benefit 
extends to the public at large.107 
Note that “right” is used the first time in the sense of a 
Hohfeldian “power,” and is used the second time in the sense of 
a Hohfedian “privilege.” In others words, the Restatement was 
guilty of the core ambiguity in the use of terms that Hohfeld 
sought to extirpate. Hohfeld would be turning over in his grave. 
In short, the campaign launched by Lewis and Bigelow 
to have the entire restatement project conform to Hohfeldian 
terminology survived into the First Restatement of Property and 
the Restatement of Business Associations. But otherwise, it 
quickly fell apart. It was too much to expect lawyers to begin 
speaking in a different language.108 
 
 106 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.1 (1983). 
 107 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.18 (2000). 
 108 This was recognized at the time. See William R. Vance, The Restatement of 
the Law of Property, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 175 (1937) (“The use of the Hohfeld 
terminology is greatly helpful in stating specific problems that require nice analysis, 
but it is not suited to descriptive or expository writing addressed to even such a 
specialized portion of the public as the members of the bar and the bench. Lawyers and 
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III. THE RESTATEMENT AND THE BUNDLE OF RIGHTS 
The fact that Hohfeld’s peculiar terminology failed to 
catch on across the entire ALI project, and that it soon died 
even within the confines of the Restatement of Property, does 
not mean that Hohfeld’s influence, or the climate of opinion that 
allowed so many to embrace his prescriptions with such 
enthusiasm, did not have a profound impact on the Restatement of 
Property. Although Hohfeld never used the expression “bundle of 
rights” to describe property, his writings on property clearly 
presupposed a conception of property that came to be summarized 
by the bundle metaphor. Property in a Hohfeldian world consists 
of various packages of rights, privileges, powers, and immunities, 
with their correlates and opposites. Precision is important in 
delineating the elements in each package. But, by implication, 
there is no limit on the way in which the elements can be 
combined—or recombined if recombination is thought to be 
appropriate. Similarly, Hohfeld thought there was no such 
thing as a right good against the world. All packages of 
property could be reduced to combinations of elements good as 
between individual persons.109 So viewed, there is no inherent 
structure or architecture to property.110 Each set of circumstances 
is governed by a unique combination of elements, which can be 
modified as perceptions of public policy evolve. Hohfeld’s view of 
property was effectively what a later generation would call the 
“bundle of rights” or “bundle of sticks.” 
The first Reporter of Property, Harry Bigelow, fully 
assimilated and embraced this view of property. In his 1926 
memo, for example, Bigelow illustrated the concept of property 
by instancing A’s ownership of a farm: 
Legally this means the following: A has with regard to that 
particular piece of soil an indefinitely large number of interests: that 
his neighbors shall not look at it, flood it by turning water on it, or 
walk across it; to cultivate it in certain ways; to raise money by 
giving another person legal rights in it; to dispose of all legal rights 
in it. His first interest the law does not protect, the second it protects 
with qualifications, the third it protects almost completely, and so on 
                                                                                                                                     
judges do not in fact understand the Hohfeld system, and one suspects that even the 
restaters have their difficulties with it . . . .” (footnote omitted) (documenting mistakes 
in the use of Hohfeld’s terminology in the RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY)). 
 109 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract 
Interface, supra note 83, at 786 (“Hohfeld conceived of in rem rights as a kind of cluster 
bomb of actual and potential in personam rights.”). 
 110 Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 
1692 (2012). 
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with others, by giving him various kinds of rights, in the broad 
sense. These rights, in the broad sense, may be grouped under 
various headings such as right as correlative to duty, powers, 
privileges, etc. The aggregate of these rights with respect to the soil 
constitute A’s property with regard thereto. That is, property is a 
collective word denoting the totality of A’s rights with regard to his 
land . . . . Each individual right that A has in the land may be 
properly spoken of as a property right. When a person has the 
totality of rights with regard to soil that the law creates we have the 
norm of property, or complete ownership.111 
Although Bigelow in this passage does not expressly adopt the 
metaphor of the “bundle of rights,” one could not ask for a 
clearer expression of the “bundle” view of property, complete 
with references to Hohfeldian terminology (“right as correlative 
to duty, powers, privileges, etc.”).112 Ownership of a farm can be 
cashed out in terms of “an indefinitely large number of 
interests.”113 Some of these the law protects; some it does not. The 
totality of the interests protected by law constitutes the “norm of 
property.”114 Bigelow clearly embraced the extreme nominalism 
about the concept of property associated with the bundle 
metaphor. 
The same conception of property was formally adopted in 
Chapter 1 of the Restatement, albeit in a somewhat cryptic 
fashion. Recall that sections 1-4 of Chapter 1 set forth the 
definitions of “right,” “privilege,” “power,” and “immunity,” more 
or less taken straight from Hohfeld. Section 5 then provides: 
§ 5. Interest. 
The word “interest” is used in this Restatement both generically to 
include varying aggregates of rights, privileges, powers and 
immunities and distributively to mean any one of them. * * * 115 
This generic concept of “interest” is then picked up again in 
Section 10, which defines “owner”: 
§ 10. Owner. 
The word “owner,” as it is used in this Restatement, means the 
person who has one or more interests.116 
 
 111 Bigelow Memo, supra note 4, at 6. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 5 (1936). 
 116 Id. at § 10. 
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“Ownership,” in other words, refers to nothing other than the 
collective bundle of “interests”—that is, rights, privileges, powers, 
and immunities—which attach to a particular person. In fact, the 
Restatement is even more nominalist about property than 
Bigelow had been in his 1926 memo. There, you will recall, 
property was defined as interests of a person with respect to a 
thing. In the text of the Restatement, the “thing” disappears. 
Ownership refers to a collective of interests of a person. Taken 
literally, there is no difference between “property” and other 
legal relations. “Property” is just an empty vessel, into which 
any collection of “interests” of persons can be poured. 
We do not mean to overstate the causal connection between 
the bundle of rights conception of property and the various failings 
of the Restatement of Property. Just as the various Hohfeldian 
definitions in Chapter 1 were quickly forgotten, so was the 
definition of ownership as a collection of interests. 
Nevertheless, the underlying conception of property as a 
bundle of rights was given a decisive boost by the ALI’s 
endorsement, and quickly became a kind of American 
orthodoxy.117 The bundle was congenial to a variety of actors. It 
was consistent with the perspective of legal formalists like Powell, 
who thought law could be described as a system of rules, because 
it implied that there could be a different rule for each situation. It 
appealed to progressive/sociological reformers like Lewis and 
Bigelow who wanted to rationalize the law to make it conform 
more closely to what they perceived to be the public interest. It 
was embraced by the Legal Realists, of whom Casner was 
perhaps an unconscious disciple, who wanted to expand public 
regulation of property without any concern for constitutional 
protections of property. And it was adopted by law and economics 
scholars, who preferred to analyze property disputes in terms of 
contractual models (transaction costs) or tort models (cost 
internalization).118 To all these proponents, the bundle model was 
appealing because it purported to be scientifically sophisticated 
 
 117 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 
26-29 (1977); Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: 
PROPERTY 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980). More recently the 
bundle picture has been challenged from feminist, Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix 
Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH. L. REV. 
239, 241 (1994), philosophical, J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 
43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 737 (1996), and economic, Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. 
Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001), 
perspectives. For a debate on the bundle picture, see Symposium: Property: A Bundle of 
Rights?, 8 ECON. J. WATCH 193 (2011), available at http://econjwatch.org/issues/ 
volume-8-issue-3-september-2011. 
 118 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 117, at 375. 
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and oriented to real world detail, but otherwise imposed no 
constraints on their aspirations. 
Although there is no direct causal link between the 
bundle of rights metaphor and the failure of the Restatement of 
Property, we think the embrace of the bundle idea by the founding 
generation of the restatement enterprise, and its unquestioning 
acceptance by succeeding generations of reporters, made that 
failure more likely. If property is just a bundle of rights, with no 
inherent structure, then one can start anywhere one wants in a 
Restatement. One can start with what is familiar from the 
classroom (the estate system), or one can start with the issue 
du jour (landlord-tenant law). In effect, the bundle allows one 
to avoid choices on what to cover. 
The bundle also disavows any connecting threads among 
different issues in property. This too facilitates piecemeal 
restating. By implying that property is an ever-mutating 
institution, the bundle also reduces the incentive to provide a 
complete restatement of property. To the contrary, it makes it 
more likely that the enterprise will gravitate toward the pet 
projects of whoever happens to be in control of the process at 
any point in time. 
Finally and most critically, a Restatement of Property 
built on the sands of the bundle concept is unlikely to have a 
great deal to say of sustaining interest or value. It is little 
wonder that a Restatement built on this foundation has seen 
relatively little use, and has had relatively limited influence. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the many volumes appearing under the title 
“Restatement of Property,” property has never really been 
restated. In a grand irony, the project that through its adoption of 
Hohfeldian terminology was supposed to provide the undergirding 
for the rest of the Restatements was never finished. We have 
argued that the choice of Hohfeldian framework, interpreted as 
the bundle of rights—with its atomized legal relations and its 
reductionist approach to in rem rights—contributed to the 
shortcomings of the Restatement of Property. The bundle picture 
was fully compatible with progressive aspirations, the 
postponement of major areas and difficult issues, and the 
piecemeal treatment of whichever topics suit the fancy of reporters 
and reformers. Indeed, it was compatible with anything. Because 
the main lesson of the bundle of rights picture of property is that 
property is a collection of interests and property law is a collection 
of individual policy-driven rules, a comprehensive restatement that 
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reflected the architecture of property was not felt as a compelling 
need—the bundle denied the very existence of any such 
architecture. There is little reason to restate the bundle, and, if 
property is a bundle, little reason to restate the law of property. 
Would it be possible at this late date to return to 
Bigelow’s original plan, appoint a new cadre of reporters, 
instruct them to stick to restating the law without advocating 
sweeping reforms, and produce, at long last, a complete 
Restatement of Property? We doubt it. Such a Restatement would 
be truly valuable only if animated by a shared conception of an 
imminent architecture in the law of property. We happen to 
believe there is such an architecture, grounded in a basic 
commitment to owners’ exclusion rights, modified by select 
governance regimes that respond to problems generated in part 
by transaction costs. But there is no universal agreement about 
this. The cadre of reporters selected to implement the plan 
would likely go off in all directions, pursuing different 
hobbyhorses, just as their predecessors did. Moreover, many of 
the areas in Bigelow’s plan that have remained untouched, 
including security interests and their many offshoots in the 
form of derivatives, not to mention intellectual property rights, 
have become immensely complex and contested, which would 
further compromise any attempt at comprehensive treatment. 
Finally, we think the animating vision of the original 
Restatement project—which emphasized the improvements 
that could be brought about by rationalizing, simplifying, and 
eliminating conflict in the common law—has largely vanished 
from the ranks of the American professoriate. The vision of the 
law as political struggle, with competing ideologies and interests 
seeking dominance in any available forum, is widespread 
enough that a new group of restaters would likely not rest 
content with restating the law, but would seek to remake it in 
accordance with their own views. If so, there is little reason to 
think that a new Restatement would avoid the failings of the old. 
